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I. INTRODUCTION
“American men have no history,” declared pioneering masculinities
scholar, Michael Kimmel.1 Masculinities, the study of how men relate to each
other and construct their identities, can be used as a powerful sociological and
legal tool to understand institutions, power structures, and human relations.
While the history of American immigration law has revealed rich multi-dimen-
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1 MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA 1 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter KIMMEL, MAN-
HOOD]; see also Cliff Cheng, Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An
Introduction, 7 J. MEN’S STUD. 295, 297 (1999), (concluding that “[m]en as gendered beings
usually are not studied” or when they are it is from a point of biological predeterminism).
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sional narratives of class, race, and domestic and international politics,2 sparse
historical work has considered the masculinities dimensions of immigration
law.3 This Article considers how unpacking the masculinities dimensions of
our paradigmatic shifts in immigration policy might offer an additional—even
unifying—dimension to previously disparate and divergent immigration laws
worthy of further research. This Article concludes that it is critical to make
masculinities visible in immigration law and policy to understand how domi-
nant masculine imperatives shape citizenship itself.4
This Article suggests that our immigration laws and policies reinforce
dominant masculinities at the border by excluding marginalized masculinities
and admitting those who comport with dominant masculinity norms. This Arti-
cle considers whether the state is not just enforcing immigration laws at its
borders but whether it also enforces masculinity norms.
Such an analytical and historical examination might prove influential in
modern immigration reform. As private citizens take up guns and machetes to
“defend” our nation’s borders,5 as political movements call for the “taking back
of our country,”6 and as anti-immigrant violence and sentiment escalates to
dangerous levels,7 deepening our understanding of immigration law’s under-
pinnings in terms of masculinities is acutely important.8 Contemplating the uni-
fying thread of dominant and marginalized masculinities underlying
immigration law suggests a cautionary tale for modern immigration legal
responses.
This Article first provides a brief overview of hegemonic, dominant, and
marginalized masculinities concepts, revealing the insider/outsider dimensions
of masculinities theory that are relevant to its application to immigration law. It
2 See, e.g., LIONEL CANT ´U, JR., THE SEXUALITY OF MIGRATION: BORDER CROSSINGS AND
MEXICAN IMMIGRANT MEN 45 (Nancy A. Naples & Salvador Vidal-Ortiz eds., 2009)
(explaining that immigration restrictions have generally been along race, class, gender, sexu-
ality, and political ideology lines).
3 See, e.g., id. at 39.
4 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of
Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 379 (2012) (calling for “the next step in
identifying the connections between immigration outside the law and the idea of Americans
in waiting is to compare, in the framework of these [legalization] programs, which unautho-
rized migrants can make stronger or weaker claims to being Americans in waiting”).
5 See, e.g., Greg Magnus, Vigilantes at Border Won’t Be Tolerated: Police Get Ready for
Watchers Today, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 16, 2005, at B4 (explaining that volunteer
“Minutemen” once brought machetes, baseball bats, and pepper spray to the border when
watching undocumented immigrants cross the border near San Diego, CA).
6 See, e.g., Son of 1776, The Plan to Take Back Our Country, WE THE PEOPLE USA (Sept.
25, 2012), http://wethepeopleusa.ning.com/group/theplantotakebackourcountry?groupUrl=
theplantotakebackourcountry&xg_source=activity&id=2482704%3AGroup%3A18717&
page=2.
7 See Mark Potter, Along Mexican Border, US Ranchers Say They Live in Fear, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 25, 2011, 8:13 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45440385/#.UVC-IVebZ2o; see also
Sandy Yang, Activists Urge Arizona to Put Stop to Citizen Patrols Immigration; “It’s Not
Their Job to Defend, to Harass People, Stalk People, Injure People. That’s Nobody’s Job”,
OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 19, 2002.
8 See, e.g., Doug Brugge, Pulling Up the Ladder: The Anti-Immigrant Backlash, in EYES
RIGHT!: CHALLENGING THE RIGHT WING BACKLASH 191, 199 (Chip Berlet ed., 1995) (stating
that “[t]here is a clear lack of a sense of the history of immigration in the current out-cry”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 3 17-MAY-13 8:38
566 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:564
then provides examples of how our immigration laws enforce masculinities—
admitting immigrant populations that conform to dominant conceptions of
western masculinities and excluding marginalized masculinities. Finally, this
Article notes the implications of this thesis to modern immigration law in its
endorsement of a masculinized state, and the enforcement of a masculinized
conception of citizenship. This Article introduces the relevance of this method-
ology. There is indeed rich and robust work to be done to test these theories and
to reveal the value in and the limits of this unitary narrative.
II. HEGEMONIC AND DOMINANT MASCULINITIES ARE FRAMED
RELATIONALLY AND DEPEND ON MAINTAINING A MARGINALIZED “OTHER”
Masculinity is “both omnipresent and invisible.”9 After famously declar-
ing “American men have no history,” Michael Kimmel—and other masculini-
ties scholars—undertook the monumental task of documenting how manhood
and masculine relations in America have shaped history, institutions, and social
order, and have evolved over time.10 He revealed the history of changing con-
ceptions of “ideal” masculinity, but also the competing versions that challenged
the normative view.11 Kimmel’s work identified transformational historical
moments during which American masculinities were in crisis as men
reinvented and redefined their identities and their social interactions. This Arti-
cle suggests that these masculinities crises or transformational episodic periods
align with peak nativist sentiments and dramatic shifts in our immigration law
and policy in notable ways.
Masculinities are distinctly a relational concept as institutions create mas-
culinities and masculinities also construct institutions,12 rendering them keenly
relevant to a thorough account of immigration law. Masculinities are fluid and
characteristically dependent on the “other” to define itself, rendering it hard to
capture and explore masculinities in isolation without its relational constructs.13
It is the framing of the “other” to define masculinities that positions masculini-
ties theory as so informative to understanding immigration law. Likewise, our
immigration laws explicitly and implicitly reflect a legal, political, and social
framing of the “other,” which, this Article reveals, aligns tightly with prevailing
masculinities.
This Article particularly relies on concepts of hegemonic masculinity,
dominant masculinities, marginalized masculinities, and hyper-masculinity to
support its thesis. Hegemonic masculinity has been described as the “defining
9 Stefan Dudink et al., Editor’s Preface: Historicizing Male Citizenship to REPRESENTING
MASCULINITY: MALE CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN WESTERN CULTURE ix, ix (Stefan Dudink et
al. eds., 2007).
10 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that the task of documenting a history
of men as men involved charting the definition of masculinity and how it has changed histor-
ically, and also how manhood has affected the activities of men).
11 Id. at 4.
12 TODD W. REESER, MASCULINITIES IN THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (2010).
13 See id. at 38.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 4 17-MAY-13 8:38
Winter 2013] ENFORCING MASCULINITIES AT THE BORDERS 567
gender performance of Euro-American males.”14 Hegemonic masculinity the-
ory defines a dominant conception of masculinity as synonymous with
power.15 It explains how definitions of manhood in American culture reinforce
the power that some men maintain and wield over women and other men.16 It is
a “culturally idealized form of masculine character.”17
Hegemonic masculinity frames manhood as the quest to acquire and retain
the symbols that express manhood,18 such as strength, success, and control.19
Hegemonic masculinity imperatives exert pressure on men to conform to its
ideals, but these cultural traits need not correspond closely to the actual person-
alities of the majority of men.20 Hegemony is thus described by the “successful
claim to authority,” distinct from actual authority.21 Indeed, while men as a
group may be dominant and powerful, most men as individuals do not feel
powerful.22 The hegemonic model only actually represents a small number of
men, but large numbers are “complicit in sustaining the hegemonic model.”23
Men who do not meet these hegemonic norms will conclude that they are
somehow “unworthy, incomplete, and inferior.”24 Hegemonic masculinities are
thus a relational concept, “not a fixed character type, always and everywhere
the same,” and “always contestable.”25
Hegemonic masculinity is sustained by the quest for a dominant strand of
masculinity and the perceived powerlessness that men can derive from the con-
stant pressure to achieve this masculinity.26 This perception of inadequacy can
lead to hyper-masculine expressions. Hyper-masculinity is a theory of exagger-
ated masculinity expressed as a manifestation of one’s insecurities.27 Hyper-
masculinity is a “hedge, an effort to offset feelings of masculine inadequacy.”28
Hyper-masculinity has been used to explain some acts of male violence,
14 Cheng, supra note 1, at 298 (noting how “in addition to being white and male, important R
demographic characteristics include being able-bodied, heterosexual, Christian . . . , first
world . . . , and ranging in age from 20 to 40”).
15 See R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES xviii (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that the concept of
hegemonic masculinity was first introduced in the 1980s and has since come under some
critique leaving the lingering question whether to discard, reconstruct, or reaffirm framing of
hegemonic masculinity).
16 Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in SEX, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: THE NEW BASICS, AN
ANTHOLOGY 58, 61 (Abby L. Ferber et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Kimmel, Masculinity as
Homophobia].
17 Cheng, supra note 1, at 297 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). R
18 Id. at 300.
19 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 16, at 61.
20 CONNELL, supra note 15, at 77.
21 Id.
22 Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 201, 213 (2008).
23 Cheng, supra note 1, at 297 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). R
24 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 16, at 61 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA 128 (1963)).
25 CONNELL, supra note 15, at 76.
26 Dowd, supra note 22, at 213.
27 JOSEPH H. PLECK, THE MYTH OF MASCULINITY 96 (1981).
28 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 161. R
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extreme conservative viewpoints, and bodybuilding behaviors, to name a few
expressions.29
Dominant and marginalized masculinities are hallmark characteristics of
Western masculinities—particularly, the use of marginalization as an inter-
group dynamic to sustain dominant masculinities.30 As Cheng explains,
“[O]ne’s membership in either the dominant group or a marginalized group is
based on our conformity to hegemony”: you either conform and belong to the
dominant group or you do not conform and you are marginalized because you
threaten the dominant hegemonic strand.31 Dominant masculinities refer to the
“most common, celebrated, widespread, or powerful” types of masculinities.32
Marginalization describes “the relations between the masculinities in dominant
and subordinated classes or ethnic groups.”33 Marginalization is thus always
relative to the “authorization of hegemonic masculinity of the dominant
group.”34
The exclusion of marginalized and threatening groups has long been a
“masculine retreat” in our nation’s history, as dominant masculinities have
espoused consistent sentiments of nativism35 and fears of feminization.36 Hege-
monic masculinity is distinctly framed “in relation to femininities and subordi-
nated and marginalized masculinities.”37 It necessitates a hierarchy by
positioning masculinity in a hierarchical relationship to femininity.38 It refers to
the “cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position
in social life. At any given time, one form of masculinity rather than others is
culturally exalted.”39 It is thus framed heavily by what it is not: namely, that
men not be gay and not be feminine. Connell described “gayness” as the
“repository” of what is “symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculin-
ity . . . .”40 Masculinity is historically anchored in an exclusionary paradigm,
systematically excluding women, immigrants, and gays.41 Hegemonic mascu-
linity is also historically anchored in nativism and shaped by governing race
relations.42
29 PLECK, supra note 27, at 96.
30 Cheng, supra note 1, at 300. R
31 Id.
32 JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, HEGEMONIC MASCULINITIES AND CAMOUFLAGED POLITICS:
UNMASKING THE BUSH DYNASTY AND ITS WAR AGAINST IRAQ 159 (2010).
33 CONNELL, supra note 15, at 80.
34 Id. at 80–81(emphasis omitted) (noting that “terms such as ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and
‘marginalized masculinities’ name not fixed character types but configurations of practice
generated in particular situations in a changing structure of relationships”).
35 ARMANDO NAVARRO, THE IMMIGRATION CRISIS: NATIVISM, ARMED VIGILANTISM, AND
THE RISE OF A COUNTERVAILING MOVEMENT 20 (2009) (“Nativism, the fear of foreigners,
was embedded in the country’s immigration experience.”).
36 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 62. R
37 Cheng, supra note 1, at 297 (citation omitted). R
38 MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 32, at 164.
39 CONNELL, supra note 15, at 77.
40 Id. at 78.
41 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 62; see also CONNELL, supra note 15, at 78–80.
42 See CONNELL, supra note 15, at 80.
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Masculinity is historically fluid, rendering it rich for analysis in immigra-
tion law.43 R.W. Connell explains, “To recognize gender as a social pattern
requires us to see it as a product of history, and also as a producer of his-
tory.”44 Masculinity is often deployed as a political tool,45 as this Article will
examine. The next sections of this Article examine how paradigmatic shifts in
immigration law and policy have aligned with masculinities in crisis and how
masculinities have shaped the ultimate direction of immigration law.
III. MAINTAINING DOMINANT MASCULINITIES AT THE BORDERS THROUGH
THE EXCLUSION OF MARGINALIZED MASCULINITIES
This Article considers how immigration law reinforces hegemonic mascu-
linity imperatives. Perhaps the two most explicit examples are the exclusion of
gays and the treatment of women immigrants.46 This section considers the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act and the Quota Acts distinctly because they align with trans-
formational episodic shifts in masculinities.
A. Marginalized Effeminacy and the Chinese Exclusion Act
Chinese immigrants have been described as “[b]y far . . . the worst
received of all the immigrant groups. . . . They were discriminated against,
segregated, physically attacked, lynched, and were victims of ‘ethnic cleans-
ing.’ ”47 The dimensions of this discrimination have been unpacked in terms of
race, class, nativism, and more, yet its masculinity dimensions have been far
less theorized.48
This Article considers whether changing and destabilized American mas-
culinities prompted the hyper-masculine rejection of marginalized masculini-
ties, further explaining the Chinese Exclusion Act in historical context. The
United States experienced an economic transformation from 1800 to 1840 as it
constructed mass transit, expanded commerce, expanded westward, and urban-
ized.49 These shifts were both liberating to men and deeply destabilizing to
masculinities because they uprooted the stability that land, craftsmanship, and
small towns previously provided.50 Masculinity in the nineteenth century
43 See generally id. at 183–224.
44 See id. at 81; see also KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that “we . . . R
cannot fully understand American history without understanding masculinity).
45 See CANT ´U, supra note 2, at 45.
46 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 134 (2004) (explaining how women who married immigrants lost their citizenship).
47 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 25.
48 See, e.g., Karen J. Leong, “A Distinct and Antagonistic Race”: Constructions of Chinese
Manhood in the Exclusionist Debates, 1869–1878, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: CUL-
TURES OF MANHOOD IN THE AMERICAN WEST 131, 132 (Matthew Basso et al. eds., 2001)
(concluding that “[s]cholars have examined how gendered arguments for exclusion relied on
the image of the Chinese prostitute, yet largely have neglected complementary constructions
of Chinese and Anglo-American working-class masculinity.”). See generally FRANK H. WU,
YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 20 (2002) (explaining how “Asian
Americans [as a group] have been excluded by the very terms used to conceptualize race”).
49 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 16. R
50 Id. at 18 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that each citizen was “equally
impotent, poor and isolated” and democracy “breaks the chain and frees every link”).
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shifted to the capitalist market, individual pursuits, increased mobility, and
wealth.51
As artisans and tradesmen sensed destabilization, they increasingly
opposed women in the workplace and prioritized native-born men.52 Kimmel
summarized antebellum masculinities: “[T]he American working class . . . was
self-consciously white, native-born, and male, rooted as much in racism, sex-
ism, and xenophobia as in craft pride and workplace autonomy—a combination
that has haunted its efforts to retrieve its lost dignity and organize success-
fully . . . .”53 Masculine insecurity abounded: “[H]is sense of himself as a man
was in constant need of demonstration. Everything became a test—his relation-
ships to work, to women, to nature, and to other men.”54
Chinese immigration escalated just as American masculinities were desta-
bilizing in the mid-1800s following a combination of economic opportunities in
the United States and political upheaval in China.55 This coincided with the
first expansive wave of immigration in the United States from 1840 to 1860.56
The Chinese immigrants were predominately male.57 Many worked on the rail-
roads, in mines as laborers or cooks, and in laundries.58 Early on, Chinese
immigrants provoked mixed responses in the United States, with some immedi-
ately hostile to the Chinese and others embracing the labor.59
Ninety percent of all Chinese immigrants resided in eleven far Western
states.60 Masculinities in general were acutely exaggerated in California as the
California gold mines drew primarily men in an individualist pursuit—indeed
ninety-three percent of the California population from 1849 to 1850 was
male.61 One observer explained that women were scarcer than gold.62
51 Id. at 17 (explaining how “equal opportunity meant equal opportunity to either succeed or
to fail”).
52 Id. at 23 (describing how riots erupted after nativists demonstrated against immigration).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 30–31 (explaining how there was no anchored patriarchal lineage anymore).
55 Chin Kim & Bok Lim C. Kim, Asian Immigrants in American Law: A Look at the Past
and the Challenge Which Remains, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (1977). The Chinese had
been immigrating to the United States for over thirty years before the anti-Chinese sentiment
hit its peak. LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 7 (1995).
56 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 19. A total of 6.6 million immigrants came to the United
States from Western Europe during this wave, mostly from Germany, Ireland, Great Britain,
Canada, and France. Id. This volume of immigration exceeded the existing native popula-
tion. Id. A myriad “pull” and “push” factors led to this immigration wave, including a robust
American economy and abundant land opportunities drawing immigrants to American shores
and a population explosion, political struggles and conflicts pushing migration. Id.
57 CANT ´U, supra note 2, at 46.
58 SALYER, supra note 55, at 7.
59 Id. at 8.
60 Roger Daniels, Chinese and Japanese in North America: The Canadian and American
Experiences Compared, in 1 THEMES IN IMMIGRATION HISTORY 91, 94 (George E. Pozzetta
ed., 1991).
61 See Gold Rush, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND WORKING-CLASS HISTORY 531
(Eric Arnesen ed., 2007); see also Susan Lee Johnson, Bulls, Bears, and Dancing Boys:
Race, Gender, and Leisure in the California Gold Rush, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE:
CULTURES OF MANHOOD IN THE AMERICAN WEST, supra note 48, at 45, 45 (concluding that
Anglo male “nostalgia took on a special meaning in California’s Southern [gold] Mines,”
particularly as the absence of white women challenged male restraint); KIMMEL, MANHOOD,
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The Civil War propelled a broad debate about American masculinity into
the “nation’s consciousness”; it was not only a war about slavery, states’ rights,
and economic roots, it was also a “gendered war in which the meanings of
manhood were bitterly contested.”63 Kimmel concludes that it reclaimed north-
ern masculinities, claimed manhood for black men, and vilified southern man-
hood as feminized.64 Masculinities remained deeply destabilized—even
exacerbated—after the Civil War by rampant industrialization, the closing of
the frontier, women entering the public sphere, and the presence of both freed
slaves and immigrants.65
The anti-Chinese sentiment rose around 1870, catalyzed by labor leaders’
economic concerns.66 A severe depression in California from 1873 to 1878
helped spurn the animosity toward the Chinese, as some felt threatened by the
job shortages and the lower wages that the Chinese immigrant population might
intensify.67
Centuries of scholars have considered the race and class dimensions to this
campaign of discrimination.68 This Article observes that masculinities scholars
have also examined how dominant Western masculinities were part of the
underpinnings of Chinese restrictionist legislation.69 The Chinese exclusion
movement framed a “broad-ranging, gendered argument” effectively “[measur-
ing] Chinese men against normative standards of Anglo-American masculinity
and find[ing] them wanting.”70 The exclusionary argument from a masculini-
supra note 1, at 37 (explaining how women acted as a “moral restraint, since men, alone,
were not capable of retaining their [ ] emotions, their violence, their aggressive, competitive,
acquisitive edge”).
62 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 42 (explaining how male behavior, language, and
dress changed in the West, the observer commented that “all the restrictive influence of fair
women is lost, and the ungoverned tempers of men run wild” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
63 Id. at 49.
64 Id. at 49, 51.
65 Id. at 52–53 (“Such a large-scale loss of control as a civil war, the new political and
social claims of women and freed blacks, and failed attempts at escape all signaled the
inadequacy of the various strategies American men had developed upon which to ground a
secure sense of themselves as men.”). Industrial output in the United States increased dra-
matically by 500% from 1870 to 1900, positioning large factories to dominate employment.
Id. at 57. Americans also increasingly urbanized. In 1830, about one in fifteen Americans
lived in municipalities greater than 8,000 people, one in three by 1900, and one in two by
1910. Id. at 58.
66 SALYER, supra note 55, at 12.
67 Id. at 9. Certainly some Americans, fresh off a Civil War spurred by treating another
population of racial minorities as morally inferior, understood the risks in the hostility
toward the Chinese and opposed this rising hostility. See id.
68 Anti-Chinese sentiments were motivated by strong overarching characterizations of their
work as “menial,” international political fears, racism, and fears of assimilation. See, e.g.,
SALYER, supra note 55, at 15 (noting an underlying belief that the Chinese would not or
could not become American); see also LEONARD DINNERSTEIN ET AL., NATIVES AND STRAN-
GERS: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC AMERICANS 233 (5th ed. 2010).
69 See CANT ´U, supra note 2, at 45–46 (explaining how sex intersects with the racial dimen-
sions of Chinese exclusion).
70 Leong, supra note 48, at 132. See JOHNSON, supra note 46, at 7 (citing John Higham’s
study of nativism that concluded that much of America’s intolerance for immigrants has
come from deviations from “the perceived Anglo-Saxon norm”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 9 17-MAY-13 8:38
572 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:564
ties lens—succinctly stated—was that “Chinese men did not meet the ideal of
Anglo-American masculinity and thus could not be virtuous republican citizens
[which] ideologically justified restricting Chinese immigrant labor.”71 Nativist
strategies thus framed the effeminacy of non-white men to support their exclu-
sionist agenda.72
While the racist underpinnings were evident, much of the anti-Chinese
sentiment was also rooted in an expression of hegemonic and dominant mascu-
linities. The Workingman’s Party bluntly concluded that the Chinese “have no
sex.”73 Contradictory images emerged of the Chinese as both hyper-masculine
and effeminate.74 Dominant American conceptions of masculinities were
deployed to frame Chinese men as lacking honor and “feminized.”75 Diplomat
Peter Parker complained of the “ ‘painful want of manliness and sincerity’ of
Chinese officials.”76 The Chinese state was feminized in the Western commu-
nity.77 Ruskola summarized that “[i]ndeed, Western observers often went
beyond innuendo in impugning the norms of Chinese masculinity. Asia . . . had
been associated with sodomy . . . [and some commentators were] convinced
that sodomy was widely practiced among Chinese men.”78 Nativists heavily
exploited images of the Chinese prostitute79 to justify prevailing rejections of
Chinese manhood, suggesting that Chinese men exploited women in ways that
failed “to protect female virtue—and revealed their unsuitability as Ameri-
cans.”80 The focus on Chinese prostitutes and the “illicit sexuality associated
with Chinese laborers implicated the Chinese male as immoral, uncivilized, and
fundamentally unfit for American citizenship.”81 Ruskola explained how
“international law provided a vocabulary and a racialized and sexualized logic
for transforming China’s desire to define its own sovereignty into a perverse,
queer ‘arrogance’ that was represented in turn as a violation of European states’
rights of sovereign equality.”82
71 Leong, supra note 48, at 132. The Chinese suffered from Western stereotyping that posi-
tioned Asian culture as “submissive: culturally prone to be physically unaggressive, politi-
cally docile, and accommodating.” Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, in 4 ASIAN
INDIANS, FILIPINOS, OTHER ASIAN COMMUNITIES AND THE LAW 382, 387 (Charles McClain
ed., 1994) (noting that these stereotypes “in part, [stem] from Western interpretations of
certain Asian cultural and aesthetic values.”). These stereotypes were catalyzed by the ideo-
logical underpinnings of Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism was used to support argu-
ments of racial and ethnic inferiority, but also dominant masculinity norms. KIMMEL,
MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 62–64.
72 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 64. R
73 Leong, supra note 48, at 144.
74 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 65. R
75 See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Raping Like a State, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1477, 1516 (2010)
(noting that “[f]or many, the lack of honor in China was primarily a corollary of its femi-
nized nature. . . . Chinese associated ‘true glory’ with literary pursuits, while being a soldier
was ‘derogatory to honour’ ” and recognizing the “trope of Chinese effeminacy”).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1532–33.
78 Id. at 1517.
79 See, e.g., Leong, supra note 48, at 131.
80 Id. at 132.
81 Id. at 131–32.
82 Ruskola, supra note 75, at 1518–19.
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The House Committee on Education and Labor issued a report on Chinese
immigration in 1878 finding three reasons why Chinese men would be “unde-
sirable citizen[s]”: their effect on the labor markets, their societal effects, and
their inability to assimilate.83 This report concluded that “the Chinese evi-
denced peculiar moral habits in ‘their treatment of women’ by profiting from
their sexual servitude.”84 It found that “Chinese men failed to establish nuclear
family households”; they “distinguished themselves from other immigrants”
because they did not bring their wives or families with them.85
And marginalized masculinities were also invoked in response to anti-Chi-
nese sentiments. One political strategy, for example, involved the Chinese
explicitly chastising the Irish immigrant population as “always drunk and fight-
ing,” suggesting that the Irish posed a greater threat worthy of exclusion.86
Indeed, the Irish were also heavily ridiculed and “stamped with a problematic
masculinity,” labeled as primitive, uncivilized, and inferior.87
B. Masculinities in Crisis Coincides with the Nativist Sentiment and Peak
Restrictionist Legislation
This Article next considers how destabilized masculinities might likewise
offer further depth to historical understandings of the immigration quota sys-
tem. The United States experienced its historic second wave of immigration
from 1870 to 1920, yielding an unprecedented twenty-six million immigrants.88
Both nativism and immigration law underwent a transformational paradigm
shift between the late 1800s and the early 1900s.89 While some nativist senti-
ment festered in the mid-1850s, the anti-immigrant sentiment largely abated
during the Civil War.90 Nativism91 resurged and “cast an increasingly wider
net” in the 1900s.92 This section posits that this expansion was spurred, not
only by economic conditions and vast immigration expansions,93 but also by
changing masculinities.
83 Leong, supra note 48, at 133.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 SALYER, supra note 55, at 43.
87 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 23.
88 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 22. Like the first wave of immigrants, the second wave
immigrants came to American shores through a combination of push and pull factors. Wide-
spread poverty, unemployment, and instability in Europe combined with the United States’
need for cheap industrial labor catalyzed the second wave. The first part of this second wave
migrated from Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland. From 1890 to 1920, the migration pat-
terns shifted from Northern Europe to Central and Eastern Europe, including immigrants
from Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Id. at 22–23.
89 SALYER, supra note 55, at 245 (concluding that fundamental principles governing immi-
gration law were established between 1891–1924).
90 See NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 22.
91 See BRUCE DORSEY, REFORMING MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER IN THE ANTEBELLUM CITY
201–02 (2002) (breaking apart various strands of nativism, such as political nativism and
religious nativism).
92 See SALYER, supra note 55, at 121.
93 See, e.g., id. at 121–22 (arguing that the state of the economy has been a critical trigger to
nativist movements).
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A profound shift in this historical period transformed measures of mascu-
line power from physical strength to wealth.94 It left men punching a time
clock, working for corporations and dependent on them, and performing work
that “every woman [knew] she could easily undertake.”95 Predominant histori-
cal narratives have concluded that restrictionist legislation enacted from 1875
to 1924 was spurred by fears of overcrowding, crime, poverty, job threats,
wage depreciation, and assimilation concerns.96 Yet masculinities were also
destabilized and in crisis during this rise in nativism. Historically, manhood in
America had been characterized by self-control and autonomy, but the rise in
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration “often emasculated life.”97
Andrew Kimbrell summarized that “[t]he advance of the Industrial Revolution
cost men their independence, dignity, and the sense of personal responsibility
and creativity associated with individual crafts and small-scale farming.”98 The
“industrialized male” became “the victim of two enclosures,” becoming “dis-
possessed” as he moved into smaller quarters with less land and spending long
hours in the industrial workplace away from his family.99 These changes dis-
rupted “virtually every personal and social relationship a man had, changes that
are with men to this day.”100
Kimmel also chronicled how the early 1900s challenged and overwhelmed
prevailing American masculinities.101 The presence of freed blacks and immi-
grants in the workplace threatened “native-born white men for dominance on
what had been their turf.”102 For many men the only retreat was to restore
“historical notions of masculine virtue”; for some, the prescription was to stop
the “rising tide of color,” as one observer described it, that immigrants and
blacks created; for some, the prescription focused on threats presented by
women, gays, and lesbians.103 A sentiment festered that masculine identity
could be retained “by excluding the ‘others.’ ”104
The very definition of manhood changed at the turn of the century. The
more modern term “masculinity” replaced the term “manhood.”105 Masculinity
was distinctly defined in its juxtaposition to femininity: “Masculinity was
something that had to be constantly demonstrated, the attainment of which was
94 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 16–17.
95 Id. at 58–59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 See NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 24 (noting that there were very few national policies
about immigration before 1875).
97 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 58 (explaining how fewer Americans owned shops, R
farms, etc.).
98 ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE MASCULINE MYSTIQUE: THE POLITICS OF MASCULINITY 41
(1995).
99 Id. at 38–39.
100 Id. at 39 (emphasizing heavily the impact that industrialization had on fatherhood).
101 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 62. R
102 Id. at 59.
103 Id. at 62 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id. at 62; see also Joe L. Dubbert, Progressivism and the Masculinity Crisis, in THE
AMERICAN MAN 303, 310 (Elizabeth H. Pleck & Joseph H. Pleck eds., 1980) (concluding
that “[t]he evidence clearly suggests that around 1900 tensions between American men and
women were building considerably, judging by the frequent discussions of marital
tensions”).
105 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 81. R
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forever in question—lest the man be undone by a perception of being too femi-
nine.”106 In the 1890s, one historian described the “fear of feminization” as
reaching a “national psychic crisis.”107 Differing accounts exist as to why men
feared feminization so deeply. Some believed that cultural feminization
emerged from the cultural invasion of the “others,” while others attributed the
city environment to fears of feminization, some believed that it arose from the
predominance of women in the lives of boys, or the demands of American
culture itself.108
As masculinities destabilized, renewed and heightened prejudices emerged
against immigrants in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.109 Immigrants
became lightning rods of blame upon which native-born white men directed the
plight of urbanization and depressed economic conditions.110 Kimmel summa-
rized the role masculinities played in the nativist movement of the early twenti-
eth century:
Racial exclusion and anti-immigrant nativism were again a recourse for some who
searched for a foundation for secure manhood. Successive waves of immigrants were
depicted as less mentally capable and less manly—either as feminized and effete or
wildly savage hypermasculine beasts—and thus likely to dilute the stock of “pure”
American blood.111
The nativist movement had legal, cultural, and social dimensions to it. The
movement sought to increase assimilation through literacy tests and other mea-
sures; it sought to purge the “undesirables,” such as prostitutes, beggars, anar-
chists, and imbeciles, from the population; and it sought to restrict the total
number of immigrants regionally.112
Prior to the Civil War, most immigrants were from Northern and Western
Europe.113 The nativist movement led to the Quota Act of 1921 and the Quota
Act of 1924.114 The Quota Act of 1921 was “one of the most radical and far-
reaching events in the annals of immigration legislation.”115 It imposed a tem-
porary quota effectively restricting the total number of immigrants to 350,000,
106 Id. at 81–82 (explaining how “[m]asculinity required proof, and proof required serious
effort . . .”).
107 Dubbert, supra note 104, at 303 (explaining how this was “doubly provoked by the
announcement of the closing of the frontier and the strident militarism so characteristic of
the age”).
108 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 82–83. R
109 DINNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 170 (noting how much of this prejudice was
based on flawed scientific theories and shifting socio-economics).
110 See id.; see also DORSEY, supra note 91, at 201.
111 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 128. R
112 See NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 27–31 (noting that these nativist measures drew pointed
lines between old immigrants and new immigrants, suggesting that the new immigrants were
not contributing as the old immigrants had); see also SALYER, supra note 55, at 121.
113 A.W. Carlson, One Century of Foreign Immigration to the United States: 1880–1979, in
1 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION & ETHNICITY 65, 66 (George E. Pozzetta ed., 1991).
114 SALYER, supra note 55, at 121.
115 SALYER, supra note 55, at 134–35 (internal quotation marks omitted). The quota system
notably benefits existing immigrants as the proportions were structured to skew numbers to
benefit the existing population.
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seeking to curb immigration particularly from Southern and Eastern Europe.116
It limited the total number of immigrants to three percent of the total foreign-
born population residing in the United States at the time of the 1910 census.117
The Immigration Act of 1924 further increased Northern European quotas and
decreased Southern and Central European quotas,118 cutting the total annual
quota to about 165,000, and making the quota system permanent.119 It reduced
the immigration cap from three percent to two percent of the foreign born pop-
ulation in the United States and cued the triggering census data from the 1890
census instead of the 1910 census.120 Salyer described the Quota Act of 1924
as the “pinnacle of its success” for the nativist movement.121
Throughout the debates surrounding the Quota Acts, “[r]acist impulses”
regarding immigration continued to be “suffused with gender imagery.”122
Anti-immigration arguments were built on gendered hierarchies that were rife
with contradictions but fundamentally challenged “non-conforming”
masculinities.
IV. EMBRACING THE “HUDDLED MASSES” THAT CONFORM
TO PREVAILING MASCULINITIES
Just as masculinities have shaped who we exclude from our nation’s bor-
ders, masculinities have also defined which of the “huddled masses” we allow
in. This section provides two representative historical examples of which popu-
lations have conformed to prevailing masculinities.
A. Breadwinners at the Borders
Family unification has been the “touchstone” of American immigration
law since 1965.123 This immigration law transformation aligned with trans-
forming masculinities of the period. After masculinities destabilized in the
early twentieth century by the end of World War II, one masculine retreat for
restabilization had become the colonization of the home and the family.124 In
suburban post-war America, the fatherhood role came to embody masculinity
and the suburban home became the “new arena for proving one’s manhood.”125
Being a male “breadwinner and family provider remained the centerpiece of
116 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 30–31; see also Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5,
§ 2(a), 42 Stat. 5.
117 § 2(a), 42 Stat. at 5; see also NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 30–31.
118 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 31.
119 See id.; see also Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(a)–(b), 43 Stat. 153,
159.
120 § 11(a)–(b), 43 Stat. at 159 (reducing the quota even further to 150,000 in later years).
The act set a minimum quota from any one country at one hundred.
121 SALYER, supra note 55, at 135.
122 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 128–29. Filipinos, for example, were cast as both R
too much and too little of a real man: “effete and effeminate: small with delicate features,
great dancers who possessed an obsessive concern with clothing and appearances” yet also
as “hypermasculine ‘jungle folk,’ ‘scarcely more than savages . . . .’ ” Id. at 129.
123 See, e.g., Brugge, supra note 8, at 196.
124 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 105, 149.
125 Id. at 150, 155, 162 (noting that this idea was further endorsed by social science). This
was a careful line to navigate, however. Fathers needed to “get involved—but not too
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middle-class masculinity.”126 There was an almost “frantic” movement to rein-
vigorate “traditional norms.”127 The father became an anchor of masculine sta-
bility. There emerged a movement for “emotional normality of the nuclear
family, as father and mother embodied instrumental and expressive functions,
both of which are necessary for social order and stability.”128 At the same time,
femininity was starkly defined in domestic terms.129 This post-war conception
of manhood remained steeply framed around the “other”—“[i]f the suburban
breadwinner father didn’t exactly know who he was, he could at least figure out
who he wasn’t.”130 Failing to conform to the domestic breadwinner model
risked accusations of homosexuality.131
Following these masculinities shifts, the national immigration law under-
went a correlating paradigmatic shift. Phase one of the paradigm shift was codi-
fied in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which retained the 1924
national origins quota system, but also created a preference for skilled workers
and relatives of citizens or lawful permanent residents.132 Certainly, some
objected to retaining the national origins quota system based on changing
national values.133
Phase two of the paradigm shift was realized in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, in which the historic quota system was abolished
entirely.134 The dominant narrative supporting the 1965 legislation is that vast
cultural changes catalyzed by the civil rights movement altered American’s
views toward race. Importantly, however, the cultural shifts reflected in the
1965 Act encompassed the new family focus of American masculinity as well.
The quota system was replaced with an annual cap on immigration regard-
less of country of origin.135 Senator Edward Kennedy heralded the act as a
victory over “radicalism” and “reaction,” celebrating the shift away from a sys-
tem “conceived in a . . . period when bigotry and prejudice stalked our streets,
involved.” Id. at 162. This “presented an exceedingly thin line between feminization of the
overdomesticated dad and the irresponsibility of the absentee father . . . .” Id.
126 Id. at 161 (explaining how “[r]eal men were breadwinning men”).
127 Id. at 155.
128 Id. at 150.
129 Charlotte Hooper, Masculinist Practices and Gender Politics: The Operation of Multiple
Masculinities in International Relations, in THE “MAN” QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 28, 35 (Marysia Zalewski & Jane Parpart eds., 1998).
130 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 155.
131 Hooper, supra note 129, at 35.
132 Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §§ 201(a), 203(a), 212(a), 66 Stat.
163, 163, 175–83 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)).
133 President Truman attempted to veto the legislation stating that:
These are only a few examples of the absurdity, the cruelty of carrying over into this year of
1952 the isolationist limitations of our 1924 law.
In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of
the past, as we are in this field of immigration.
Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization,
and Nationality, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN 1952–53, at 441, 443–44 (1966).
134 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911 (amending the Immigra-
tion & Nationality Act).
135 Carlson, supra note 113, at 68.
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when fear and suspicion motivated our actions toward the world around us.”136
The Act allowed a total of 290,000 visas a year, 170,000 from Eastern hemi-
sphere countries with a 20,000 per country limit and 120,000 from Western
countries with no per-country limit.137 Critically, however, there were no
annual limits on immediate relatives (spouses, unmarried children, or parents of
American citizens).138 It created a tiered-preference system with various levels,
prioritizing four tiers for family of lawful permanent residents, then three tiers
for employment-based immigration with professional skills, and one tier
reserved for refugees.139 These immigration preferences coincided with and
reflected back the new cultural ideals emphasizing the nuclear suburban family
and the American male’s role in that family structure. Much of this framework
remains intact today.
B. Constructing Warriors and Citizens
Masculinities are often expressed through institutions. The military is
largely designed around male traits140 and entrenched in a “combat, masculine-
warrior” paradigm that “tacitly endorse[s] excluding others who contradict their
image of the combat, masculine warrior.”141 The military is a “proving ground
for masculinity,” frequently seen as “a rite of passage, transforming boys into
men.”142
Military service has long been a proving ground for both masculinity and a
transformative ground for citizenship.143 The military’s role in citizenship is
important because it is a tool that “reshapes relationships not only between
136 See U.S. Catholic Bishops and Immigration: Background: 1965 Legislation, AM. CATH-
OLIC HISTORY RESEARCH CTR. & UNIV. ARCHIVES, http://cuomeka.wrlc.org/exhibits/show/
immigration/background/1965-intro (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
137 See Carlson, supra note 113, at 68; see also Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (amending the Immigration & Nationality Act).
138 Id. (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to read that qualifying fam-
ily members (spouse, child, parent) of qualifying citizens and lawful residents are entitled to
a non-quota immigrant status).
139 Employment First Preference (E1) goes to priority workers. Employment Second Prefer-
ence (E2) goes to professionals holding advanced degrees and persons of exceptional ability.
Employment Third Preference (E3) is for skilled workers, professionals, and unskilled work-
ers. See Employment-Based Immigration Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/
visa/immigrants/types/types_1323.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2013); see also Carlson, supra
note 113, at 69.
140 HELENA CARREIRAS, GENDER AND THE MILITARY: WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OF
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 49 (2006).
141 KAREN O. DUNIVIN, MILITARY CULTURE: A PARADIGM SHIFT? 1, 16–17 (Air War Col-
lege, Maxwell Paper No. 10, 1997), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/Max-
well/mp10.pdf.
142 CARREIRAS, supra note 140, at 41; see also KENNETH CLATTERBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES ON MASCULINITY: MEN, WOMEN, AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY 41
(1990) (stating that some radical writers position violence as the “ultimate test of
masculinity”).
143 Ronald R. Krebs, Rights and Gun Sights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship
1 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at http://search.
proquest.com/docview/276312273 (testing the conventional view that armed forces have
been “guardians of national virtues”).
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groups and agents of the state, but among groups as well.”144 Theodore
Roosevelt explained that “a shared military experience would forge a unified
nation out of the mass of newcomers.”145 Notably, throughout our nation’s his-
tory, military service has been a tool to make male warrior citizens under terms
entrenched in hyper-masculinity. Krebs summarized that minorities historically
have used military service to “proceed[ ] from the margins to the center by
exploiting the military’s dependence on their human capital and by extracting
concessions from the state.”146
At times, this proved challenging. The Irish immigrants, for example,
quickly joined militia companies to “claim[ ] for themselves a badge of respect-
able manliness and citizenship . . . .”147 They then used their military service to
mitigate nativist challenges by emphasizing their patriotic service and hero-
ism.148 Yet this was a tenuous position for immigrants to occupy.149
American immigration law and policy has consistently positioned military
service as a bridge to citizenship in our nation’s history in ways that are
paradigmatically entrenched in hyper-masculinity and framed in hegemonic
masculinity. Foreign-born immigrants have disproportionately populated the
American Army,150 despite episodic concerns about their loyalty.151 From the
1820s to the 1880s, 25%–75% of soldiers in the United States Army were for-
eign born, while the population as a whole ranged from 10% in 1850 to 15%
foreign born from 1860–1900.152 These military personnel were largely Euro-
pean—70%—of which 60% were from Ireland, 20% from Germany, and 12%
from England or Scotland.153 In World War I, one-sixth of those drafted were
immigrants, again reflecting an over-representation.154 Again, in World War II,
the total population was 15.4% foreign born, yet 18% of military personnel
were foreign born.155
144 Id. at 78.
145 Id. at 1. “[M]ilitaries mold nations by molding individuals, one person at a time.” Id. at
5.
146 Id. at 81–82.
147 DORSEY, supra note 91, at 227 (using military service as a vehicle to “display their
‘patriotic manhood’ ”).
148 Id.
149
“ ‘In times of peace we Irish are not fit to enjoy “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness,” but when the country needs our aid, we are capital, glorious fellows.’ Military service
thus offered Irish men an early opportunity to claim their status as white citizens and men.”
Id. (quoting a writer for the Catholic Boston Pilot). Tension emerged, for example, when
Irish men were recruited to the military with promises of citizenship, yet the United States
War with Mexico proved problematic because the military was burning and attacking Catho-
lic churches. NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 21.
150 SUE E. BERRYMAN, WHO SERVES? THE PERSISTENT MYTH OF THE UNDERCLASS ARMY
23 (1988).
151 Id. at 57.
152 Id. at 23, 57 (noting that 50%–70% of the Navy was foreign born in the nineteenth
century).
153 Id. at 23.
154 Id. at 34–35 (noting that 13.2% of deferments of draft were for “alien allegiance”).
155 Id. at 37, 57 (explaining that government leaders worried about loyalty, particularly for
Germans and Austrians).
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This trend continues today. In 2009, there were approximately 29,000 for-
eign-born military personnel who were not citizens.156 Most recently, the mili-
tary announced a path to accelerated citizenship to those immigrants willing to
serve.157 Military service has long been—and remains—a path to citizenship or
expedited citizenship that rewards dominant masculinities.
V. HYPER-MASCULINITY CHARACTERIZES AND PROBLEMATIZES
MODERN IMMIGRATION RESPONSES
Recent immigration patterns have shifted, positioning today’s immigrants
more heavily from Central America and Asia than Western Europe.158 Immi-
gration patterns over the past seventy years have shifted heavily to our nation’s
southern borders. From 1950 to 1990, two million Mexicans immigrated to the
United States, more than from any other country in the world.159 This has been
referred to derogatorily as the “browning” of America and has led to spikes in
“immigrant bashing and scapegoating.”160
Examining the masculinity underpinnings of historical immigration trends
sets up the importance of a modern inquiry to understand how current dominant
masculinities shape and drive immigration law and policy. The terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, dramatically catalyzed sweeping changes in immigra-
tion law and policy. While September 11, 2001, offered a message of national
security imperatives, critically the seeds of today’s anti-immigration activism
and rhetoric began earlier with shifting masculinities and escalating
nativism.161
Modern masculinities have left men again feeling “beleaguered and
besieged, working harder and harder for fewer and fewer personal and social
rewards.”162 The underpinnings of masculinity previously included economic
autonomy, social mobility, and domestic control, yet each of these foundations
has eroded.163 In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, downward mobility was more
common than upward mobility for many men in their twenties.164 Native-born
men faced increased competition for scarce jobs, particularly men in segments
of the economy that “cling[ ] most tenaciously to the ideology of self-made
masculinity,” such as small shopkeepers, farmers, and skilled manufacturing
156 Julia Preston, U.S. Military Will Offer Path To Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009,
at A1.
157 BETH BAILEY, AMERICA’S ARMY: MAKING THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 251 (2009). The
military will recruit skilled immigrants with temporary visas, offering them a pipeline to
citizenship in as short as six months. Preston, supra note 156, at A1 (noting that immigrants
with green cards have long been eligible to enlist, but this program opens access to tempo-
rary immigrants).
158 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 117.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 DEEPA FERNANDES, TARGETED: HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE BUSINESS OF IMMIGRA-
TION 212 (2007) (positioning the rise of today’s anti-immigration politics in the neo-Nazi
and white supremacy movements of the 1990s and nationalizing with the 1996 immigration
reform legislation).
162 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 197.
163 Id.
164 See id.
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workers.165 Many of the economic clashes directly squared native-born white
American men with newly arrived immigrants as these men “faced increased
competition for those scare jobs from newly arrived immigrants.”166
Men began to perceive themselves as the “real victims in America.”167
Many men’s rights political groups formed to assert this position explicitly.168
The men’s rights groups sought to reassert traditional masculinity by excluding
the “other” men from idealized masculinity, including non-whites, non-native-
born men, and gay men.169 Yet, in many ways, this is just history repeating
itself, as prior generations of men have similarly sought to deploy exclusionary
techniques to restore what they perceived as lost masculinity.170
The key defining characteristic of this generation of masculinities in crisis
is its resorting to anger, even violence, in response to threatened masculini-
ties.171 This can be viewed as an expression of hyper-masculinity. Kimmel
answers the critical question: “How did the chronic restlessness of the nine-
teenth century self-made man, which became the general malaise and discon-
tent of twentieth-century masculinity, morph into the explosive rage of the
twenty-first century?”:
For one thing, the very adherence to traditional ideals of masculinity now leaves so
many [men] feeling cheated, unhappy, and unfulfilled.
American white men bought the promise of self-made masculinity, but its foun-
dation has all but eroded. Instead of questioning [these] ideals, they fall back upon
those same traditional notions of manhood—physical strength, self-control, power—
that defined their fathers’ and their grandfathers’ eras, as if the solution to their prob-
lem were simply “more” masculinity.172
Sometimes this anger is self-directed in the form of depression, but often it
is an external “lash[ing] out at ‘them,’ the ‘others,’ who now occupy the posi-
tions that once belonged to native-born middle-class white men.”173 Simply
stated, many men feel like victims “deprived of their entitlement” as the “gov-
ernment . . . doles it out to everyone else—nonwhites, women, and
immigrants.”174
A resurgence of hate groups in America, labeled the “White Wing,” bears
testament to this anger-motivated victimization model of masculinity. The
Southern Poverty Law Center reports 1,018 active hate groups operating in the
United States as of 2011.175 While their ideologies are explicitly racist,
homophobic, and nativist, their positions are also steeped in masculinity under-
165 Id. at 216.
166 Id. (explaining how downward mobility hit the lower middle class especially hard as
union jobs went overseas, farmers lost their farms, and shop owners were driven out of
business).
167 Id. at 199.
168 Id. at 201 (identifying many of the groups and their political agendas).
169 Id. at 203.
170 Id. at 211 (explaining how these efforts have “haunted men for a century”).
171 Id. at 217.
172 Id. at 218.
173 Id. at 220.
174 Id. at 230.
175 Hate & Extremism, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/what-
we-do/hate-and-extremism (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (“Since 2000, the number of hate
groups has increased by 69 percent. This surge has been fueled by anger and fear over the
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tones.176 Many of these groups are focused on our nation’s borders. The South-
ern Poverty Law Center has tracked massive expansion from approximately
forty rogue, private “border patrol” groups in the spring of 2005 to over 144
groups by the spring of 2007.177 Much of the growth has been made possible
by the increased emphasis on national security following 9/11, making the
movement “palatable” to a broad audience.178 The Southern Poverty Law
Center further reports that the number of armed “Patriot groups” rose by 755%
in the first three years of Obama’s presidency, from 149 in 2008 to 1,274 in
2011.179
Today’s anti-immigrant movement aligns with the masculinity crisis
squarely. The most central component of the modern “anti-immigrant campaign
is its ability to deflect anger about the negative effects of the current US ‘eco-
nomic restructuring’ onto the scapegoat of immigrants.”180
This modern wave of immigration reform is distinctly characterized by a
hyper-masculine response to immigration reform in its exclusionary paradigm,
the role of citizen militias, militarized borders, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. In
1986, Congress again turned its attention to immigration with the Immigration
Reform and Control Act.181 The Act shifted to a stronger enforcement mecha-
nism regime. The Act imposed requirements on employers to attest to the
immigration status of their employees, criminalized the knowing recruitment
and hiring of undocumented immigrants, and granted amnesty to certain immi-
grant groups.182 Federal policy became known as the “militarization of the
Cactus Curtain,” as U.S. Border Patrol deployed militaristic equipment, infra-
red technology, and radar to apprehend 1.13 million undocumented migrants in
1991 and 1.5 million in 1992.183 Importantly, as Navarro concludes, “no evi-
dence existed that supported the effectiveness of the . . . border militarization
operations in halting . . . the flow . . . of the migrant[s].”184
Yet ten years later, illegal immigration remained a “pressing public policy
action issue.”185 The next major immigration reform came in the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.186 As the name of
the legislation suggests, this legislation was distinctly enforcement oriented.
The most distinct provisions in the bill dramatically increased enforcement at
nation’s ailing economy, an influx of non-white immigrants, and the diminishing white
majority, as symbolized by the election of the nation’s first African-American president.”).
176 KIMMEL, MANHOOD, supra note 1, at 229–30 (explaining how these groups recruit what
they describe as “real men”).
177 ROXANNE LYNN DOTY, THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS: IMMIGRATION AND THE
POLITICS OF EXCEPTIONALISM 36 (2009).
178 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 160, 178–80 (playing to fears in the media by suggesting
that Al Qaeda would infiltrate the United States through Mexico).
179 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 175.
180 Brugge, supra note 8, at 192.
181 Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
182 Id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 3360–61, 3369.
183 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 127–29 (applying militaristic names to immigration control
efforts such as “Operation Hold the Line” and “Operation Gatekeeper”).
184 Id. at 130.
185 Id. at 120.
186 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
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the nation’s borders, allocating millions of dollars to militarize the border with
increased agents, fencing, and state-of-the-art technology.187 The Act also
markedly increased the penalties for illegal border crossings and created an
entry-exit database.188
Fueled by high-profile terrorist attacks and increased anti-immigrant fer-
vor directed at Latinos,189 immigration policy shifted formally toward militaris-
tic border patrols and informally toward vigilante, militia-style, citizen patrols.
In addition to the armed government presence at our borders, a critical piece of
the modern immigration movement is the rise of self-proclaimed citizen mili-
tias, as watchdogs policing America’s borders.190
VI. CONCLUSION: MASCULINIZED CITIZENSHIP
Gender permeates our culture. It establishes “patterns of expectations for
individuals, orders the social processes of everyday life, is built into the major
social organizations of society, such as the economy, ideology, the family, and
politics, and is also an entity in and of itself.”191 It is critical to make masculini-
ties visible to understand how dominant masculine imperatives shape politics,
law, and citizenship.192 This Article seeks to illuminate the role that masculini-
ties have played in shaping immigration law and policy.
The role of masculinities shaping immigration law and policy historically
is both problematic and insightful as we think about modern immigration
reforms. James Messerschmidt stresses the importance of examining masculini-
ties, particularly as they are camouflaged. He highlights how masculinities can
be used and camouflaged and manipulated in ways that contribute to discourse
in a “manufactured fiction.”193 In Representing Masculinity, masculinities
scholars highlight the central question another way, advocating that we unpack
how the “implicit masculinity of the abstract individual has shaped modern
187 Id. §§ 101–04, 110 Stat. at 3009-553–55.
188 Id. §§ 105, 110 Stat. at 3009-556, 3009-558–59.
189 NAVARRO, supra note 35, at 127–28 (explaining how anti-immigrant sentiment rose in
the early 1990s in response to the World Trade Center bombing and “ongoing media cover-
age helped foment a resurgence of xenophobia, nativism, and racism specifically directed at
Mexicanos”).
190 Amy Bach, Vigilante Justice, NATION, June 3, 2002, at 18; see also DOTY, supra note
177, at 36. There is certainly a stark difference between the militia rhetoric and the reality.
Not all of the activity is truly an expression of hyper-masculine militarism. Armando
Navarro says that some describe the movement’s actors as “wannabe militia vigilantes,”
noting that the volunteers are “disproportionately retired, elderly, White males, some armed,
who sat in lawn chairs, under an umbrella with flags from their respective states flying,
drinking cold beer while listening to radios, and some using binoculars . . . .” NAVARRO,
supra note 35, at 181. Border vigilantism has become a “sport of sorts.” Id. at 162 (emphasis
omitted).
191 Cheng, supra note 1, at 296 (citation omitted). R
192 Dudink et al., supra note 9, at xiii.
193 MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 32, at 157 (applying masculinities theory to examine the
ways that President Bush Sr. and President Bush Jr. used masculinities to sell war). Mes-
serschmidt concludes that “both presidential forms of communicative social action con-
structed a metaphorical hierarchical gender relationship between a hegemonic masculine
hero and emphasized feminine and infantile victims, and between that hero and toxic mascu-
line villains . . . .” Id. at 155–56.
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political culture from its origins in the late eighteenth century until the present”
and concluding that “the implicit masculinity of the abstract individual resulted
in the political exclusion of women and of men who were considered
unmanly.”194
When we unveil the implicit or camouflaged masculinities underlying
immigration law we see masculinities as an undercurrent to both who we have
let into our nation’s borders and who we have excluded. We see appeals to “a
common masculinity” that is “continuously produced within” a culture and a
“specific, contextually defined political process[ ].”195 This embeds an implicit
masculinity within constructions of citizenship itself. Gendered framings sug-
gest a problematic layering of masculinities norms on citizenship directly.196 It
suggests that the state is being used as a tool to maintain dominant masculini-
ties, or is itself a direct actor.
This Article reveals how immigration law has historically been—and con-
tinues to be—used as a vehicle to reflect prevailing dominant masculinities. It
has examined just a few historical examples; indeed, there are countless
others.197 There is more work to be done to disaggregate masculinities from the
prevailing race and class accounts to uncover the full masculinity underpin-
nings of our immigration law. As our immigration reform efforts continue to
divide, polarize, and stagnate, however, this work seems imperative to achieve
a lasting immigration reform that reflects broader societal values.
194 Dudink et al., supra note 9, at xii.
195 Id. at xiii.
196 See, e.g., DORSEY, supra note 91, at 219–20 (“And because citizenship rights were
inseparable from masculine identity in nineteenth-century America, nativism spilled over
into a controversy about manliness in northern cities.”).
197 See, e.g., CANT ´U, supra note 2, at 70–73 (explaining how gays and lesbians have navi-
gated American immigration law).
